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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Despite the fact that the WTO has helped to reduce the overall level of tariffs 
with increased transparency, a majority of the developing countries with the capacity 
to increase exports of labour intensive manufactures continue to face significant 
barriers in accessing foreign markets. Tariff rates applied by the developed countries 
for textile and clothing and leather for instance are much higher than those on other 
manufacturing products such as electronics, computers and telecom equipment, thus 
indicating a clear discrimination against exports of the developing countries. 
Moreover, tariff peaks, tariff escalation, tariff rate quotas and other non-tariff 
measures including antidumping duties, countervailing duties, and safeguard 
measures to protect against serious injury from import surges, allowed under the 
WTO, have become major impediments to market access for developing countries 
exports. 
A key element of the Doha Round of trade negotiations is liberalisation of 
trade in industrial products, commonly known as non-agricultural market access 
(NAMA). Negotiations under NAMA focus on market access for all products that 
are not covered by the negotiations on agriculture or services and aim to reduce, if 
not possible to completely eliminate, tariff and non-tariff barriers that restrict trade in 
these products. The framework adopted for modalities for negotiations under 
NAMA, known as the July Package, envisages reduction of industrial tariffs in both 
developed and developing countries according to a formula that is yet to be agreed. 
These negotiations are important for developing countries as these will determine the 
market access opportunities available to developing countries through which they 
can improve their growth prospects. 
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This paper examines the key issues of NAMA from the South Asian 
perspective. Section II provides a background on NAMA, whereas Section III 
spells out key issues in market access. Section IV contains perspectives of 
Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka on various NAMA issues. 
Section V highlights key elements of the proposed negotiating strategy for 
developing countries. Finally, Section VI summarises the discussion and spells 
out some policy implications. 
 
II.  NAMA  BACKGROUND 
The ongoing NAMA negotiations are based on the mandate that was given for 
the Doha Round at the 4th WTO Ministerial Conference. The aim of the negotiations 
is to reduce both tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade that impede the market access 
for industrial products. The negotiations relate to all the goods not covered under the 
agreement on agriculture. Even though such negotiations essentially relate to 
industrial products, it also considers products such as natural resources including 
fisheries, forests, gems and minerals.  
The Doha mandate stresses the need for comprehensive product coverage, 
without full reciprocity, i.e. developing countries be allowed to decrease tariffs to a 
lesser extent than industrialised countries and over a longer period of time. It also 
stresses the need to address tariff peaks, tariff escalation and non-tariff barriers such 
as import quotas and technical standards.  
The first proposal for modalities of NAMA negotiations was made in 2003 by 
the Swiss chairman of the NAMA negotiating group, Pierre-Louis Girard. The key 
elements of the proposal were a ‘Swiss formula’ for tariff reduction (cutting higher 
tariff by a larger percentage than lower tariffs), a sectoral initiative for the full 
elimination of tariffs in seven sectors,1 and Special and Differential Treatment for 
developing countries.   
During the Cancun Ministerial in 2003, a second proposal on NAMA was 
made, the so-called Derbez text. This proposal included a non-linear formula similar 
to the Swiss formula along with a sectoral initiative for tariff reductions but without 
the identification of the sectors. This proposal was strongly opposed by the 
developing countries, in particular by the G-90 countries, and was not adopted in 
Cancun. During the July 2004 General Council meeting at the WTO, a number of 
developing countries opposed the inclusion of the Derbez text on NAMA in the July 
package.  In particular, the developing countries pressed for the inclusion of several 
further proposals and demanded abolition of the non-linear formula, wanted the 
sectoral tariff component to be voluntary; and asked for more flexibility in tariff cuts 
and tariff bindings. 
 
1These sectors include fish and fish products, textiles and clothing, leather, footwear, stones, gems 
and precious metals, electronic goods, and motor vehicle parts and components.   
Non-agricultural Market Access 
 
881
The July text on NAMA, drafted keeping in view the concerns of the 
developing countries, includes the following elements:  
• A formula approach for tariff reduction and for reduction or elimination of 
tariff peaks, tariff escalation and high tariffs. Key features of this approach 
are:  
o No a priori exclusion of products; 
o Reductions in tariffs from bound rates, or from twice the applied most 
favoured nation (MFN) rate in the case of unbound tariffs; 
o Credit for autonomous liberalisation (trade liberalisation on an MFN basis 
undertaken independently from the WTO negotiations); 
o Conversion of specific duties into ad-valorem duties and their binding;  
• Countries that had bound less than 35 percent of their tariffs would be 
exempt from tariff reductions through the formula, but have to bind 100 
percent of their tariff lines; and 
• A sectoral approach, aiming at eliminating or harmonising tariffs in a 
specific sector. Seven sectors had been identified previously (in the Girard 
proposal) for this sectoral approach. 
Presently, the NAMA negotiations are focused on a number of issues 
including product coverage, the formula for tariff cuts, tariff bindings, conversion of 
specific duties into ad-valorem duties, the sectoral approach to tariff cuts, flexibilities 
for developing countries, non-tariff barriers, and preference erosion. The negotiators 
aim at completing draft modalities in the above areas by July/August, and an 
agreement on full modalities by the Hong Kong Ministerial in December 2005. 
 
III.  ISSUES IN NON-AGRICULTURAL MARKET ACCESS 
 
III.1.  Tariff Issues 
Reduction and elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers have been at 
the centre of trade negotiations since the inception of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and continue to be an important subject in the 
subsequent multilateral trade negotiations.2 During the Uruguay Round, tariff 
negotiations constituted a central issue and these were held on the basis of Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) principles.3  These MFN rates were bound and could be 
increased only through negotiations under Article XXVIII of GATT and 
therefore, provide a secure and stable market access. However, considering that 
 
2The non-tariff barriers in the form of quota and bans have been removed by most of the countries 
but the barriers in terms of quality, labour standards, environment etc. have been imposed.  
3MFN requires that tariff rates negotiated between particular trading partners are available to all 
members of the WTO. 
Kemal, Din, and Ghani  
 
882
the bound rates are significantly higher than the applied rates, the market access 
remains somewhat uncertain. Besides, there are significant tariff peaks4 on 
products such as textiles, clothing and leather and leather products. Moreover, 
there has been tariff escalation resulting in heavy effective protection to value-
added activities.5 Furthermore, contingent protection instruments, particularly 
anti-dumping measures and countervailing duties, are currently being used more 
frequently. The number of anti-dumping investigations has increased sharply 
since the Uruguay Round agreements were signed: they have more than doubled 
from 156 in 1995 to 340 in 19996 [Bacchetta and Bora (2001)]. High tariff 
bounds, tariff escalation and safeguard measures indicate the heavy odds against 
exports of developing countries. Therefore, just reduction in the average rates of 
import duties would not be sufficient for the growth of exports from the 
developing economies.  
The comparison of average applied and bound rates in pre-Uruguay round 
outlined in Table 1 is quite revealing. Firstly, both the bound and applied rates of 
the developing economies are higher than the developed economies. Second, 
whereas on average there was not much difference between the bound and the 
applied rates in case of developing countries, the bound rates were 40 percent 
higher than the applied rates in case of the developed world.7 Third, both the 
bound and applied rates have been the maximum for agriculture based products, 
textiles and leather in developed economies thus discriminating against the 
developing economies.      
In the post Uruguay round applied tariff rates of the industrial countries has 
increased from 2.6 to 4.0 percent whereas the bound rate from 3.7 to 4.7 percent 
(Tables 1 and 2). That liberalisation attempts instead of reducing the tariff rates have 
resulted in higher tariff rates is quite disturbing. The increase in tariff rates seems to 
be the result of tariffication of the non-tariff barriers, i.e. after removal of the non-
tariff barriers the tax rates on such products have been enhanced. Whereas in the 
developing economies the applied rates have declined though there has been an 
increase in the bound rates. 
 
4High tariffs and tariff peaks are generally in the areas that are of export interest to 
developing countries and it includes textiles and clothing, footwear, and agriculture. The impact of 
tariffication of agricultural non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in the Uruguay Round in some cases has resulted in 
even more restrictive trade regimes.  
5Tariff escalation is quite harmful to the industrialisation process of the developing economies. 
Reduction in tariffs on raw materials by the developed countries results in higher levels of effective 
protection on exports of manufactured products to industrial countries and thus makes it even more 
difficult for developing economies to export the manufactured products to industrial countries. 
6In recent years, however, the number of anti-dumping investigations have fallen (just over 200 in 
2004). 
7However, the differential in bound and applied rates for different products and across countries 
may be high. 
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Table 1 
Pre–Uruguay Round Applied and Bound Rates of Industrial and Developing 
Economies by Major Product Group 
(Percent) 
  Industrial 
Economies 
Developing 
Economies 
 Product Group  Applied Bound Applied Bound 
1  Agriculture, Excluding Fish  5.2 7.2 18.6 19.9 
2  Fish and Fish Products  4.2 4.9 8.6 25.9 
3  Petroleum  0.7 0.9 7.9 8.4 
4  Wood, Pulp, Paper, and Furniture  0.5 0.9 8.9 10.3 
5  Textiles and Clothing  8.4 11.0 21.2 25.5 
6  Leather, Rubber, and Footwear  5.5 6.5 14.9 15.4 
7  Metals  0.9 1.6 10.8 10.4 
8  Chemical and Photographic 
Supplies  2.2 3.6 12.4 16.8 
9  Transport Equipment  4.2 5.6 19.9 13.2 
10  Non-electrical Machinery  1.1 1.9 13.5 14.5 
11  Electrical Machinery  2.3 3.7 14.6 17.2 
12  Mineral Products; Precious Stones 
and Metals  0.7 1.0 7.8 8.1 
13  Manufactures, not Elsewhere 
Specified  1.4 2.0 12.1 9.2 
 All Industrial goods  2.5 3.5 13.3 13.3 
 All merchandise trade  2.6 3.7 13.3 13.0 
Source: Finger, Ingco, and Reincke (1996). 
 
Table 2 
Post–Uruguay Round Import-Weighted Applied and Bound Tariff Rates 
(Percent) 
Country Group or Region  Applied Tariff Rate Bound Tariff Rate 
Industrial Economies  4.0 4.7 
Developing Economies  13.1 20.8 
Latin America and the Caribbean  10.1 18.6 
East Asia and Pacific  9.8 16.6 
South Asia  27.7 56.1 
Other Europe and Central Asia  9.6 14.9 
Middle East and North Africa  14.4 26.8 
Sub-Saharan Africa  16.5 19.8 
Source: Hoekman, et al. (2002). 
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The Doha Ministerial Declaration8 follows almost the same formulation as in 
the declaration to launch the Uruguay Round in 1986. It envisions reduction or 
elimination of industrial tariffs as well as an attack on tariff peaks, tariff escalations 
and non-tariff barriers in particular on products of interest to developing countries. 
These are expected to help in the growth of trade which provides opportunities to the 
developing countries to remove poverty through trade liberalisation. While they must 
reduce the level of tariffs to expose their economic activities to international 
competition, they need market access; currently their products face many obstacles 
in entering the markets of rich countries. Rich countries need to do more to reduce 
trade distorting subsidies and dismantle their existing barriers on competitive exports 
from developing countries. The important issues in this regard are: 
• Textiles and clothing is the largest export earner for many developing 
countries and the rate of tariffs is the maximum for these products. The 
effective protection rate to the higher stages of production in the textiles 
sector in the developed world is rather high.  
• Tariff peaks negotiations have to be high on the agenda. Despite low 
average non-agricultural tariffs, the products in which developing countries 
are globally competitive continue to attract relatively high tariffs. 
• Tariff escalation tilts the incentives against the development of indigenous 
processing/transformation and movement up the value-added chain. For 
diversification of economies and trade such escalation must be eliminated.  
• Specific Taxes when converted into ad-valorem rates, generally have been 
quite high. While specific taxes need to be converted into ad-valorem rate, 
the incidence must not rise.  With a view to ensuring that, to start with each 
member state should provide information on the ad-valorem incidence 
of the specific taxes.  
• Anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties,  technical standards and 
sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) requirements restrict trade and the 
possibility that the contingent protection measures may be justified on the 
grounds of environmental protection and labour standards is of great 
concern to developing world. Since developing countries generally have 
lower labour and environmental standards than developed countries, these 
would be detrimental to export and development interests of developing 
economies [Krueger (1999)]. 
The post-Doha industrial tariff negotiations are prompted by two main 
considerations: Firstly, the increasing trend towards regionalism results in 
preferential trade amongst a few countries resulting in discriminatory trade treatment 
for the countries that are not parties to the regional arrangements. Tariff negotiations 
 
8This is referred in paragraph 16 of the Declaration.  
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on multilateral basis resulting in an MFN-based tariff cuts would reduce chances of 
such discrimination. Second, industrial tariff negotiations have the potential to boost 
intra-regional trade among developing countries. The main tariff issues in the post-
Doha scenario are examined in the following.  
 
(i)  Tariff Peaks and Escalation 
The problems of high tariffs and tariff escalation remain wide spread for 
developing countries even after the Uruguay Round. A significant proportion of 
the tariff of Quad countries (USA, EU, Canada and Japan) continues to exceed 
the level of 12 percent ad-valorem even after full implementation of the Uruguay 
Round and GSP rates are taken into account (Table 3). One fifth of the tariff 
peaks of the United States, about 30 percent of those of Japan and the EU and 
about one seventh of those of Canada exceed 30 percent. Peak tariffs affect both 
agricultural and industrial products.9 The main problems in the industrial sector 
occur in food industry products; textiles and clothing; footwear, leather and 
travel goods; automotive products; consumer electronics and watches. In 
addition to extremely high tariffs and other protection measures, tariff escalation 
remains an important obstacle for developing countries to enter into the 
industrial exports. This is particularly pronounced in the sectors which are of 
direct export interest to developing countries including the South Asian 
countries. 
 
Table 3 
Developed Countries: Frequency of Post-Uruguay Round Tariff Peaks in the 
Industrial Sector by Product Groups 
(Percentage of Tariff Lines within each Group 
with Duties above 12 percent Ad-valorem) 
Product Group United States Canada 
European 
Union Japan 
Leather and Leather Products 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Footwear 
Glass Products 
Vehicles 
12 
21 
44 
42 
10 
4 
4 
45 
93 
67 
5 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
8 
22 
1 
0 
71 
0 
0 
Source: UNCTAD Trade and Development Report 1999. 
 
9Out of the total LDC exports of US$ 22.7 billion in 1999, US$ 17 billion went to the Quad 
economies. For example, more than 25 percent of their total exports are potentially affected by tariff peaks 
in Canada and 14 percent in the United States. 
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The problem of peak tariffs in the industrial sector10 occurs in four sectors: (a) 
food industry; (b) textile and clothing; (c) footwear, leather and travel goods; and (d) 
high technology goods including automotive sector. 
 (a) Food Industry: The food industry is a major area where tariff 
protection is widespread and high in the major developed countries’ 
markets even after the implementation of the Uruguay Round 
concessions. Tariff peaks and a range of additional measures extend 
far beyond the initial processing stages in a large variety of 
industries. The food industry accounts for about 30 percent of all 
tariff peaks ranging (with some exceptions) from 12 percent to 100 
percent in the EU. There are several cases of additional duties to 
compensate processing industries for higher prices of agricultural 
inputs. Examples of products subject to particularly high rates include 
cereals and sugar based products, fruit preparation and canned fruit 
juices. Similarly, the food industry accounts for one sixth of all tariff 
peaks in the United States and these also fall mainly in the 12 percent 
to 100 percent range. The United States also applies a wide system of 
combined MFN tariff quota rates in this area particularly with 
additional safeguard duties. 
 (b) Textile and Clothing:  In the major textile importing countries like the US, 
EU and Canada large proportions of clothing and textile imports are 
subject to high tariffs. Most tariff peaks are in the 12–32 percent range.  
 (c) Footwear, Leather and Travel Goods:  Footwear of various types is still 
protected by high tariffs in most developed countries. Post Uruguay Round 
MFN rates are close to 160 percent in Japan, 37.5-58 percent in the US and 
18 percent in Canada. MFN duties remain relevant, as General System of 
Preferences (GSP) benefits are limited in this sector.11                
 (d) Automotive Sector, Transport Equipment and Electronics:  With the 
exception of Japan and the Republic of Korea, level of protection for one 
or the other branch of the transport industry is rather high. In the developed 
countries MFN tariff protection is more selectively applied in the 
automotive and transport sector. In addition various developed countries 
apply high tariffs on TV receivers, TV picture tubes and some other high 
technology products. 
 
 
10The most hit from the tariff peaks are the major agricultural staple food products and fruit, 
vegetable, fish etc. 
11In the US and Canada most footwear and leather products are excluded from coverage of the 
scheme so that MFN tariffs apply fully to developing countries. 
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(ii)  Tariff Reduction Formula12 
The July Framework includes a formula approach for tariff reduction and for 
reduction or elimination of tariff peaks, tariff escalation and high tariffs. The 
following proposals are being advocated by various countries: 
 • Swiss formula with a single coefficient with conditional flexibilities for 
developing countries (EU). 
 • Swiss formula with conditional flexibility of applying two coefficients 
(Norway and the US) or four coefficients (Chile, Columbia, and Mexico). 
 • A Swiss-type formula with multiple coefficients based on tariff averages and 
with flexibilities and a credit system for developing countries (Argentina, 
Brazil, and India). 
Whereas the simple Swiss formula is transparent and easier to implement, it 
places a disproportionate burden on developing countries who would have to make 
major cuts in tariffs as compared with the developed countries. The modified Swiss 
formula allows the use of more than one coefficient for developing countries. 
However, no criterion is indicated as to how these coefficients would be determined.  
The ABI formula (proposed by Argentina, Brazil, and India) aims to address 
the concerns of developing countries with the Swiss formula for tariff reductions. As 
opposed to the simple Swiss formula which cuts high tariffs and tariff peaks down to 
the level of the coefficient regardless of the national tariff structure, the ABI formula 
takes into account the existing tariff structure of each country. The ABI formula is 
considered as more equitable as it incorporates the present tariff commitments of the 
members, and envisages an overall reduction commitment that is proportional 
amongst developed and developing countries. 
Whereas the ABI formula is based on the objective criterion of current tariff 
profiles of members and provides an effective mechanism to deal with high tariff and 
tariff peaks, it does not seem acceptable to many developed countries who consider it 
tilted in favour of countries that have high tariffs.   
Pakistan is of the view that since none of the proposals on tariff reduction 
formula seem to attract consensus, there is a need to bridge the gap between the 
present proposals while at the same time ensuring that the objectives of the Doha 
Round are not compromised. More specifically, Pakistan has proposed the adoption 
of a simple Swiss Formula with two distinct coefficients for developed and 
developing countries. These coefficients should be based on an objective criterion 
i.e. taking the overall average of the bound tariff lines for developed and developing 
 
12This section draws on (i) “Market Access for Non-agricultural Products”, a communication 
from Argentina, Brazil and India to the Negotiating Group on Market Access, WTO document No. 
TN/MA/W/54 dated April 12, 2005; and (ii) “Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products: The Way 
Forward”, a communication from Pakistan to the Negotiating Group on Market Access, WTO document 
No. TN/MA/W/60 dated July 21, 2005. 
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countries as their respective coefficients. Some of the advantages of this proposal are 
that: it is simple, transparent and easy to comprehend; it results in significant 
reduction of tariff peaks and tariff escalation; it would cut higher tariffs much more 
than lower tariffs; it would make every member contribute and every member would 
gain from increased market access; and it is based on objective criterion.  
 
(iii)  Negotiations Amongst Developing Countries 
Negotiations in the various Rounds of GATT have been amongst the 
developed countries or between the developing and the developed countries but 
hardly any amongst the developing countries.13 Whereas trade amongst developing 
countries has increased significantly, it would have been significantly higher if tariffs 
were cut on the products which they export. Negotiations on industrial tariffs 
amongst developing countries would go a long way in promotion of trade in goods 
and services. It would help in increasing significantly the share of trade amongst 
developing countries as a proportion of their total trade. 
The market access negotiations among developing countries will have 
particular significance in the context of the objective of promoting intra-trade among 
developing countries. The SAFTA would help in increasing trade amongst South 
Asian countries and negotiations with other developing countries on industrial tariffs 
would go a long way towards liberalisation of trade and improvement in the welfare 
levels. These countries may take a joint stand relating to anti-dumping, 
countervailing, environments, labour standards and other safeguard measures to 
protect their export interest.  
 
(iv)  Scope for Negotiations: Bound and Applied Rates 
An important issue in the industrial tariff negotiations is whether such 
negotiations should cover bound rate only or both the bound and the applied rate. In 
case of developed countries major proportion of their tariffs are bound but their 
bound rates and applied rates differ substantially. Reduction in bound rates, 
therefore, would not automatically result in reductions in the applied rates and hence 
the market access. Even though the average bound and applied tariffs for the 
developing countries as noted earlier were similar, bound tariffs are significantly 
higher than the applied rates for most of the products and across the developing 
countries.  
Whereas reduction in the bound rates by both the developed and developing 
economies would improve predictability of market access in the sense that the 
exporting firms are reassured that the existing applied rates would not be increased 
beyond the bound rates, reduction in bound rates would not constitute any 
 
13By negotiating reduction in tariffs on the products of their export interests, developed countries 
under GATT have gained significantly. 
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improvement of market access unless applied rates are reduced simultaneously. 
Therefore, it may be argued that market access negotiations would have to provide 
for possibilities of reductions in both the bound as well as applied rates. 
 
(v)  Credit for Autonomous Liberalisation 
While developed countries have generally reduced their tariffs in the context 
of multilateral trade negotiations, most of the developing countries have been taking 
measures to liberalise trade unilaterally outside the WTO framework. As the lower 
rates resulting from such reductions benefit the exports of developed countries, the 
credit should be given for the unilateral tariff reduction. It may be done by providing 
greater flexibility in the choice of “base tariffs” that are to be used as the basis for 
reductions. Countries are generally given choice to use the tariff rates applicable in 
the preceding 2-3 years as basis for negotiations. 
 
(vi) Relative Reciprocity in Negotiations between 
      Developed and Developing  Countries 
Another significant aspect of tariff negotiations is to ensure that the rules 
relating to relative “reciprocity” as embodied in part IV of GATT and the “General 
Enabling Clause” are fully respected in the negotiations between developed and 
developing countries. In particular, the ground rules adopted for conduct of 
negotiations need to be such that the extent of liberalising the developing economies 
should be in accordance with their level of development, trade, economic situation, 
and national policy objectives. The ground rules should further recognise that the 
developing countries may have the option to reduce duties on selected tariff headings 
and, if necessary, exclude certain sectors and sub-sectors from the liberalisation 
process. It should also be open to them to offer tariff bindings at rates which are 
higher than the reduced rates. 
 
(vii)  Staging of Tariff Reductions 
The reductions agreed in the multilateral trade negotiations in the past have 
been implemented over a period of time. For example, tariff cuts agreed in the 
Uruguay Round were implemented in equal stages from January 1, 1995 to January 
1, 2000. For some of the products, which were considered import sensitive longer 
implementation period of 8-10 years were negotiated. The ground rules for the 
current tariff negotiations may allow developing countries longer period than 
provided to developed countries either on overall basis or in respect of particular 
products.  
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(viii)  Sectoral Approach 
The developing countries have strongly resisted the proposal of sectoral 
elimination of tariffs in NAMA negotiations. While LDCs are exempt from sectoral 
approach, all other member countries would be expected to eliminate or substantially 
reduce tariffs on specific products. The developing countries feel that such 
liberalisation of their import regimes would not only entail far greater tariff cuts from 
them than from developed countries, but would also expose their industries to strong 
competition. As a result, the developing countries have consistently maintained that 
they should participate in any sectoral NAMA negotiations on a voluntary basis only. 
 
(ix)  Preference Erosion 
Trade preferences are a central issue in the ongoing efforts to negotiate further 
multilateral trade liberalisation. While most countries recognise the benefits of 
dismantling the remaining barriers to trade, some, notably the least developed 
countries, are apprehensive as they are faced with an erosion of their preferential 
access owing to across the board tariff reductions under NAMA. Preferences erosion 
is of particular concern to the South Asian region, as four out of seven SAARC 
countries have traditionally enjoyed trade preferences due to their LDC status.   
Preferences granted to least developed countries as well as universal trade 
preferences for imports from all developing countries, as extended under the GSP, 
are consistent with the GATT under the Enabling Clause. However, the developed 
countries are not legally committed to providing such preferences. They can, 
therefore, decide unilaterally on preference margins or even withdraw preferences 
without violating WTO commitments. The G-90 members have increasingly drawn 
attention to their plight in the context of market access negotiations that threaten 
their margins of preferential access. The G-90 has also called for remedies, including 
compensatory and other mechanisms, such as measures to promote exports; technical 
and financial assistance for improving infrastructure, productivity, and diversi-
fication, and for development of systems to achieve compliance with technical 
standards; and a lenient application of those standards to developing countries.  
Several options may be considered for trade preferences in the Doha Round. 
First, rather than working towards an expansion of marginal preferences for all 
developing countries, it may be useful to aim at substantial preferences for the least 
developed and other vulnerable countries. Second, the Enabling Clause may be 
amended by including small and other vulnerable countries in addition to the least 
developed countries. Third, existing preferences under the GSP should be maintained 
and legally bound in WTO. Fourth, preferential tariffs should not be defined in 
absolute terms, but should be set relative to MFN tariffs. Finally, where very specific 
and deep preferences for individual developing countries and commodities are 
concerned, a relatively strong case can be made for compensation if preference 
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margins are eroded as a result of multilaterally agreed MFN tariff reduction or of 
domestic policy changes in the developed countries. 
 
III.2.  Non-tariff Measures 
The Doha Ministerial Conference rightly called for removal of all the non-
tariff barriers on industrial products as they are the least transparent and have major 
distortionary impact. Whereas the quotas and bans for protective measures are 
almost non-existent for industrial products except in a very few countries the imports 
are subject to the following non-tariff barriers:  
• technical regulations applicable; 
• hygienic Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary measures; 
• labour standards and environmental protection; 
• quality standards; and  
• contingency protection measures such as safeguards and anti-dumping and 
countervailing measures. 
 
III.3. Dispute Resolution Understanding 
With the adoption of various WTO agreements if a country considers that 
measures taken by another country are inconsistent with the provisions of the 
relevant agreements, the matter could be challenged. This makes it a little 
difficult for larger countries to bully smaller countries into giving up their legal 
complaints. However, most of the clauses in the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU) regarding developing countries have proved to be ineffective. For example, 
Article 21.7 mandates that when a matter is raised by a developing country, the 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is to consider what further action might 
be appropriate. However, this provision has not been used by any developing country 
for various reasons but particularly due to lack of expertise and resources.14 Besides 
even though Article 22 calls for financial compensation to the complaining party by 
the country which has been found to be in violation of the rules, it has rarely been 
done.  
Even if a developing country obtains a clear legal ruling that an industrial 
country has violated its legal obligations, the developing country has no effective 
way to enforce the ruling. The only enforcement sanction provided by the WTO 
dispute settlement procedure is trade retaliation—the imposition of discriminatory 
trade sanctions by the complaining country against the trade of the defendant 
country. And trade retaliation by smaller developing countries simply does not inflict 
 
14The expertise required is in the fields of checking arguments, issues, and possibilities and 
comparing experiences and results; exploring new legal as well as economic arguments; and, 
domestically, building up an efficient and transparent liaison between the state and industry in order to 
obtain up-to-date information on trade problems in which developing countries have a stake. 
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any significant harm on larger industrial countries. In this regard, the proposal by 
Pauwelyn (2000) that “coupled with countermeasures, a broad scheme of 
compensation— additional market access offered by the losing party to WTO 
members—would provide genuine leverage to induce compliance, a move 
beneficial to all WTO members, and not just ‘compensation’ to the one or few that 
brought the case” should be seriously considered. 
 
IV.  SOUTH ASIAN PERSPECTIVE ON NAMA ISSUES 
This section contains views of Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, India, and Sri 
Lanka on various NAMA issues.  
 
Bangladesh 
Bangladesh desires deeper trade preferences enjoyed by the least developed 
countries, simplified rules of origin, and concessions in the coverage for tariff 
reductions. The July Framework incorporates a provision that developed and 
developing countries that are in a position to do so, should provide duty-free and 
quota-free access to all goods originating from LDCs within specified time 
framework. This is a weak provision and needs to be strengthened to make it 
binding. This would realise a commitment made in the Doha Ministerial Declaration 
to grant improved trade terms to the LDCs. Readymade garment (RMG) industry in 
Bangladesh, that has so far enjoyed preferential access in developed country markets, 
is not only important for the poor but has also created a social space for women in 
Bangladesh, and hence the industry must be sustained.  
The proposal for accelerated elimination of tariffs on industrial goods may 
have a negative impact on Bangladesh exports of textiles and clothing, fish and fish 
products, and leather and leather goods. As these are labour intensive and female 
intensive products, they can be treated as “sensitive products” by the developed 
countries. When LDCs were provided GSP, these “sensitive products” were usually 
excluded and Bangladesh was allowed duty free and quota free access to export these 
products. Selective reduction in tariffs in labour intensive products would lead to 
lower erosion of LDCs’ preferences.  
 
India 
India has outlined the following objectives for NAMA negotiations: 
 • Leverage autonomous tariff reduction to enhance market access in developed 
countries. 
 • Retaining some policy space for the domestic industry. 
 • Reduction of tariff peaks and escalation in developed countries. 
 • Obtain adequate flexibilities for developing countries to address 
developmental sensitivities. 
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 • Classification, identification and reduction of non-tariff Barriers/eliminate 
non-tariff barriers. 
 • Application of the formulas on Sectors on a voluntary basis, after finalisation 
of formula. 
India wants to gain greater market access to developed country markets not so 
much through reduction of their tariffs, which are already relatively low, but through 
the dismantling of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade and a generalised system of 
preference (GSP), provided unilaterally by importing countries to a selected range of 
beneficiary countries on selected products and sectors. For example, the proposed 
EU GSP provisions relating to textile and clothing.  
India also would like to resist sharp reduction in tariffs forced upon the 
developing countries by the developed ones. India would reduce tariffs 
autonomously at a pace it judges suitable for the Indian industries.  India is of the 
view that any tariff reduction formula negotiated under the aegis of the WTO would 
have to be based only on bound rates and not applied rates. India is determined to 
counter any attempt to use applied rates as the base for application of a tariff 
reduction formula. However, India does not wish that autonomous tariff reduction 
exercise to be used against them.   
India desires an equitable tariff reduction formula in the negotiations on non-
agriculture market access in the WTO keeping in view the concerns and interest of 
the developing countries. The Swiss type tariff cut formula put forward by European 
Union for entailing reduction of high tariffs by very high percentage, is not 
supported by India. Instead, India endorses the suggestion put forward by US for 
using two different coefficients for tariff reduction—one for developed and one for 
the developing countries, but with a lot of fine-tuning. Domestic industry has urged 
the government to strongly counter the “simple Swiss” formula in the non-
agricultural market access (NAMA) pillar of the ongoing World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) talks at the mini-ministerial meeting at Dalian in China.   
India is also against the proposal of a mandatory “zero-for-zero” reduction on 
7 specific  products by 2015. These are in such sectors as automotives, textiles, gems 
and jewelry, leather products, electric and electronic products, which constitute bulk 
of India’s export basket and are also products reserved for the small scale sector. A 
“zero-for-zero” regime would spell their doom by granting unmitigated access to 
large foreign firms in the same market.  
India has highlighted the need to link adoption of tariff reduction formula with 
concrete, time-bound progress on eliminating non-tariff barriers. Indian Small and 
marginal enterprises are looking at other developing countries for market access. 
They would benefit from the NAMA negotiations, if there were a uniform 
harmonised tariff all over the world. A modality to reduce the bound duties to a 
common level could also reduce transaction costs and other uncertainties related to 
complex tariff regimes. 
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Nepal 
Nepal, as an LDC with low level of industrialisation, has a significant stake in 
the ongoing NAMA negotiations in the WTO. Though Nepal has bound 99.3 percent 
of its tariff lines during its accession to the WTO in 2004 and is not required to make 
any tariff reduction commitment, the outcome of the negotiations will have far 
reaching impact on Nepalese manufacturing sector in terms of loss of policy 
flexibility, export competitiveness and preference erosion.  
Tariff escalation also hinders value addition and industrialisation in Nepal. 
The proposed non-linear line-by-line formula for tariff reduction is likely to address 
the problems of tariff escalation and tariff peaks. But LDCs like Nepal should be 
careful to ensure that the final formula has appropriate coefficients to ensure this. 
Even in cases where Nepal’s exports have duty free access, non-tariff measures, both 
legal and illegal under the WTO, hinder the conversion of market access into market 
entry. Annex B of the July framework is weak on tackling NTBs as it only 
encouraged all participants to make notifications by 31 October 2004 and to precede 
with identification, examination, categorisation, and ultimately negotiations on 
NTBs. In this sense, negotiations on NTBs are yet to start in the WTO. Nepal and 
most other LDCs also face resource constraints to set up the human and institutional 
infrastructure to address legal NTBs like those permissible under the WTO 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).  
Nepal’s objectives in NAMA negotiations are the following: 
 • Resist sectoral initiative and zero for zero approach. 
 • Ask developed and developing countries to expand market access for 
products of export interest to preference depending countries i.e., LDCs. 
Bilateral assistance could be one way of doing this. 
 • Ask the developed countries to use a corrections coefficient to improve the 
preference margins for the products that are enjoying preferential access. 
(suggested by The African group). 
 • Advocate for the establishment of a “Competitiveness Fund” with 
contribution from developed and advanced developing countries to enhance 
the supply side capabilities of LDCs and weak developing countries. 
(Suggested by Mauritius). 
 • Support other LDCs for low tariff bindings for LDCs. 
 • Ensure that the tariff reduction formula has appropriate coefficients to 
address the problems of tariff peaks and tariff escalation.  
 • Ensure that the tariff reduction formula results in improved market access in 
developing countries, including India. 
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 • Demand effective Technical Assistance from developed and developing 
members to enhance institutional and human resources necessary to 
implement WTO agreements such as SPS and TBT.   
 • Lobby for temporary waiver on SPS and TBT requirements on non-
agricultural exports from LDCs. 
 • Lobby for immediate and effective mechanism to address NTBs being faced 
by LDC non-agricultural exports.   
 
Pakistan 
As far as Pakistan’s stance is concerned it believes that tariff peaks be 
removed, the tariff escalation minimised and the developing economies be provided 
free market access. In this regard it is useful to quote from statement of Pakistan in 
the NAMA meeting held on 4 October 2004.15 Pakistan stated that whereas “there 
are hardly any tariffs on goods of exports interest of developed countries and tariffs 
only applied to goods of developing countries. The current ratio is 1:4, i.e. the goods 
of exports interest to developing country’s tariff is 4 times higher than that of the 
developed countries. This is not only creating market access problems in developed 
countries markets but also for South-South trade”. The statement called further for 
“reduction or as appropriate elimination of tariffs including tariff peaks, high tariffs 
and non-tariff barriers. Special consideration has to be given for products of exports 
interest to developing countries and there should be less than full reciprocity for 
developing countries”.  
The July Framework includes a formula approach for tariff reduction and for 
reduction or elimination of tariff peaks, tariff escalation and high tariffs. Whereas 
various proposals are being advocated by different countries, Pakistan is of the view 
that none of these seem to attract consensus. There is, therefore, a need to bridge the 
gap between the present proposals while at the same time ensuring that the objectives 
of the Doha Round are not compromised. With this in view, Pakistan has proposed 
the adoption of a simple Swiss Formula with two distinct coefficients for developed 
and developing countries. These coefficients should be based on an objective 
criterion i.e. taking the overall average of the bound tariff lines for developed and 
developing countries as their respective coefficients.  
The treatment of unbound tariffs is an important issue in the market access 
negotiations. So far, five proposals have been tabled: (i) multiplying the MFN 
applied rate of 2001 by two; (ii) marking-up unbound lines by a factor to be 
negotiated, and binding tariff lines at an average level after the application of the 
formula (the ABI proposal); (iii) capping of new bound tariffs at a ceiling of 40 
percent with target average of 25 percent and no tariff reductions in this round for 
 
15Statement of Pakistan in the Meeting of NAMA held on October 4, 2004. Available at 
<http://www.wto-pakistan.org/statements/nama0410,htm.> 
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new tariff bindings (Malaysia); (iv) the “Rational Formula” approach of a non-linear 
mark-up derived through a mathematical formula using two coefficients (Mexico); 
and (v) non-linear mark-up adding 5 percentage points (absolute) to each unbound 
rate (the CHNN proposal by Canada, Hong Kong, China, New Zealand, and 
Norway). 
Countries that have lower unbound tariffs view proposals (i) and (ii) as unduly 
favouring countries with higher unbound tariffs. Whereas the Malaysian proposal 
may suit many developing countries, it is viewed by many countries to be in conflict 
with the July Framework which requires that tariff reduction has to be 
comprehensive without ‘a priori exclusion’. The Mexican proposal appears to 
address the concerns of countries with low unbound tariffs, but it is complicated and 
thus difficult to negotiate. The CHNN proposal for a mark-up of 5 percentage points 
in absolute terms may not be acceptable to a majority of developing countries as it 
seems to favour those countries which have low bound tariffs. Against this backdrop, 
Pakistan has proposed that instead of a non-linear mark-up of 5 percentage points in 
absolute terms (as in CHNN proposal), a mark-up of 30 percentage points should be 
added to the base rate (applied rate of 2001) for each unbound line before the 
application of the formula for tariff reduction. 
 
Sri Lanka 
Sri Lanka’s negotiation position on NAMA puts emphasis on the fact the 
developed countries should eliminate barriers to free market conditions and ensure 
effective, duty free and quota free market access for non agricultural products 
originating from developing and least developed countries. As in many other 
developing countries, Sri Lanka also focuses on the same issues highlighted in the 
framework agreement such as the formula approach for tariff cuts, tariff bindings, 
sectoral approach and non-tariff barriers. 
Sri Lanka’s position supports a formula approach for tariff reduction, 
reduction or elimination of tariff peaks and tariff escalation and asks for more 
flexibility for developing countries in this regard. However, it has been critical of the 
proposed Girard formula; depending on the co-efficient adopted, tariff reduction 
could have adverse implications for the country’s industrial sector.  
For countries such as Sri Lanka where bound coverage is low but the applied 
rate is also low, the proposed tariff reduction formula penalises the country in terms 
of the extent of tariff reduction. In order to avoid such pitfalls, Sri Lanka 
spearheaded moves to include a paragraph (paragraph 6) in the framework text that 
allows a small number of developing countries not to undertake tariff reductions 
through the formula if their bound coverage is less than 35 percent. However, these 
countries will be required to bind their tariffs at the average of bound tariff rates for 
all developing countries. 
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While preference erosion is also an issue of concern to Sri Lanka, the general 
view is that it should not be addressed in isolation, in particular given that the core 
work of the WTO is on an MFN basis. Sri Lanka’s concern is more on gaining 
access to markets through tariff reductions on an MFN basis rather than directly 
addressing issues of preference erosion. Sri Lanka is yet to make a clear stand on 
carrying forward negotiations on a sectoral basis given the complexities in arriving at 
common ground.  
 
V.  NEGOTIATING STRATEGY FOR MARKET ACCESS 
Techniques and modalities that are adopted in industrial tariff negotiations have 
significant bearing on the outcome of negotiations. A variety of techniques and 
modalities evolved during the eight rounds of trade negotiations which took place 
under the auspices of GATT has been enumerated above. The South Asian countries 
have to adopt an approach that results in securing maximum reductions on products 
which they export. As regards their commitment to reduce the import duties, they may 
use product by product approach. Such products that relate to industries in which the 
country does not have the long run comparative advantage, they may agree on steep 
cuts while the other industries where long run comparative advantage exists but 
producers have become lethargic due to heavy protection, they may reduce the duties 
to ensure exposure to competition without jeopardising the industrial growth.  With a 
view to ensuring the maximum advantage, following elements may be kept in view:   
 • The South Asian countries must adopt an approach that results in securing 
maximum reductions on products which they export. Preceding the industrial 
tariff negotiations it is necessary to agree on the ground rules that would be 
followed in the conduct of tariff negotiations. Such ground rules would need 
to ensure that different needs and objectives of the participating countries are 
adequately taken into account. In other words, ground rules must 
accommodate the special needs and interests of developing and the least 
developed countries’ participants as ordained in Article XVIII and part IV of 
GATT; 
 • Developing countries determine the extent to which they are willing to 
liberalise their own economies to win tariff reductions and removal of other 
barriers with a view to having access to the markets of their trading partners; 
 • The developing countries may agree to reduce the bound rates and where 
they do not have comparative advantage to steep fall in tariff cuts both in 
bound and applied rates;  
 • The developing countries should ask for conversion of all specific tariffs into 
ad-valorem tariffs; 
 • The developing countries should strive to seek substantial reductions in peak 
MFN tariffs which apply to products of export interest to them e.g. textiles, 
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leather products, footwear, etc. and, if feasible, aim at elimination of all other 
MFN rates of tariffs and tariff escalations in sectors where they exist; 
 • The developing countries ought to seek due allowance for the autonomous 
liberalisation these countries may have undertaken. One way of ensuring 
credit for the autonomous liberalisation is to have greater flexibility in the 
choice of “base tariffs” to be used as a basis for tariff cuts as a result of the 
industrial tariff negotiations;  
 • The developing countries must seek flexibility in “staging” of tariff 
reductions. The ground rules for the negotiations should provide the 
developing countries longer period than that provided to developed countries 
for staging of tariff reductions; and 
 • The developing countries may press for international financing for training 
public officials, screening industrial countries’ trade policies, and building a 
network with other developing countries with the aim of jointly presenting 
cases could help address some of these problems 
 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
Since the South Asian countries are labour surplus, heavily dependent on the 
agriculture sector and have limited domestic markets, liberalisation efforts would go 
a long way towards realisation of their growth potential. However, they must watch 
out their interests rather carefully in view of the misuse of the safeguard measures, 
incorporation of environment and labour standards, and non-implementation of 
special provisions for developing and least developed countries.  
While the South Asian countries must reduce the level of tariffs to expose 
their economic activities to international competition, they need market access; their 
products face many obstacles in entering the markets of rich countries. In addition to 
extremely high tariff and other protection measures, tariff escalation remains an 
important obstacle for developing countries to enter into the industrial exports. Rich 
countries need to do more to reduce trade distorting subsidies and dismantle their 
existing barriers on competitive exports from developing countries. Since most of the 
developing economies including the South Asian countries have been taking 
measures to liberalise trade unilaterally outside the WTO framework, they need to be 
given credit for the unilateral tariff reduction. The ground rules for the current tariff 
negotiations may allow the developing countries longer period than provided to 
developed countries either on overall basis or in respect of particular products. 
In South Asia, only the bigger economies like India and Pakistan will be 
required to reduce tariffs under the formula approach. The smaller economies like 
Bangladesh and Nepal are exempted owing to their LDC status. Sri Lanka may also 
get an exemption in the event that the countries which have less than 35 percent of 
binding coverage are exempted from undertaking tariff reductions. Both India and 
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Pakistan should press for an implementation period of 10 years for tariff reductions 
and for a 4 year implementation period for developed countries. In the sectoral 
initiative, the South Asian countries should oppose zero for zero approach and ask 
for 10 year implementation period with back loading. The South Asian countries 
amongst themselves or with other developing economies may negotiate industrial 
tariffs on an MFN basis on trade between them. This would go a long way towards 
liberalisation of trade and improvement in their welfare levels. At the same time, 
they may take a joint stand relating to anti-dumping, environment, labour standards 
and other safeguard measures. 
The reduction of industrial tariffs under NAMA is likely to have far-reaching 
effects on market access in products of export interest to South Asian countries. The 
South Asian countries have a strong interest in further liberalisation and tariff 
harmonisation approach because their principal concern is market access. Similarly, 
the tariff peaks, another major issue for exporters in developing countries, and a 
formula of tariff cuts that facilitates a degree of tariff harmonisation is necessary. It 
is also imperative for South Asian countries to strengthen their options to use support 
measures in the future, through the negotiation of greater flexibility for themselves. 
A level-playing field is necessary not only with respect to reducing the current bias 
of the trading system, but also one that addresses the structural disadvantages that 
developing countries face in the international trading environment. The South Asian 
countries may support proposals for a substantial reduction in applied tariffs using a 
harmonisation formula that would reduce tariff peaks. In addition any tariff reduction 
formula should incorporate a mechanism for reducing tariff escalation by linking 
tariff levels in primary commodities to those affecting their processed form.   
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